Russia’s invasion of Ukraine occurred 
just as pressures in the U.S. economy appeared to be peaking, and the 
prospects of a soft landing were good. The days, weeks, and months ahead
 will bring more clarity about how it impacts the U.S. economic cycle. A
 recession is not a foregone conclusion, and companies should stay 
flexible, reassessing their outlooks and tactics as events unfold.
 
Before Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, the outlook for the U.S.
 economy was stressed but hopeful. Pandemic pressures appeared to be 
peaking, inflation was widely expected to normalize, and the Fed stood a
 credible chance of engineering a “soft landing.”
 
But an enormous humanitarian atrocity in Europe has triggered an 
unpredictable global financial and economic conflict that will see 
consequences ricochet. Though new risks have emerged, and uncertainty is
 higher, at present the main impact of the crisis on the U.S. economy is
 the exacerbation of existing pressures and risks. The path of 
inflation, and the policies to contain it, remain the main threat to the
 cycle. While that risk has gone up, it need not be a recessionary 
outcome.
 
How the Stimulus Bet Played Out 
 
As we wrote here last year,
 policy makers placed an enormous bet at the start of 2021 that 
extraordinary stimulus would transform a strong recovery into an even 
stronger expansion. The payoff would be a “tight” economy — one that 
delivered broad-based real wage gains that firms paid for with higher 
productivity growth, not by raising prices. A win-win-win for workers, 
firms, and politicians.
 
That preferred scenario has not materialized. The tight economy did 
arrive with strong nominal wage gains and signs of productivity growth. 
But inflation has grown faster, as firms discovered pricing power and 
used it widely to protect their profit margins. In February, 
year-over-year price growth stood at 7.9%, a 40-year high.
 
But it would be wrong to blame only the stimulus. Inflation was also 
driven by supply-chain bottlenecks — exacerbated by waves of the virus 
that interrupted production and slowed inventory recoveries — and a 
labor market scrambling to hire back workers, while labor supply 
sluggishly continued to normalize.
 
Pressures Appeared to Have Peaked
 
Despite this, there was clear evidence that the U.S. economy had 
passed peak economic pressure. In product markets, demand was 
normalizing, even slowing in many overheated areas, such as consumer 
durables, while inventories were growing. In the labor market, the 
frenetic pace of hiring had eased, while labor supply was finally 
normalizing.
February’s job reports, released on March 4,
 underlined all this. Firms were broadly able to hire workers in large 
numbers (+654K private payroll), which was facilitated by a continued 
strong uptick in labor participation. Meanwhile, wage growth, though 
still high year over year, was flat month over month. All this would 
have been a bullish signal that the economy remains strong and pressures
 were easing.
 
How the War Drives up Recession Risk
 
Russia’s conflict has made those markers of economic strength nearly 
irrelevant as higher-order risks are taking center stage. The prospect 
of sustained conflict and an altered geoeconomic reality have yet to 
sink in. But it’s not too early to think about how the impact could play
 out. Is a recession now in the cards?
 
The impact of an economic shock is delivered through one — or several — of three transmission channels. Let’s see where risks are highest and why.
 
Financial recessions remain the pernicious kind. 
They unfold when a shock cripples banks, either through liquidity or 
capital concerns that force them to deleverage. In their wake, they 
leave lasting asset price damage, impaired investment plans, and slow 
recoveries. This was the story of 2008 — but it was successfully averted
 in 2020.
 
The U.S. banking system was in strong shape before the war started 
and continues to exhibit very limited stress. The capital position of 
U.S. banks is strong, profitability is the best it’s been in years, and 
liquidity is extremely flush. Exposure to Russian assets is limited, and
 live data on credit spreads are reassuring.
 
Yet, there remain unknowns. Banking is an extremely interlinked 
ecosystem, which can hide vulnerabilities. A novel risk that stands out 
is a debilitating cyberattack on western financial infrastructure, a 
clear reason never to dismiss the financial sector as a source of 
serious surprise.
 
Real economy recessions are typically milder and 
driven by sudden demand or supply shocks that can tip an already 
vulnerable economy into recession. Has the Ukrainian conflict triggered 
enough headwinds to deliver such a shock? On the negative side of the 
ledger a few stand out:
 
- Energy prices (direct effects): In 2021, oil prices in the
 U.S. (WTI) rose from just below $50/barrel to more than $75/barrel. If 
prices had stayed there, the impact on inflation (and real incomes) 
would have waned, as inflation measures the change in prices, not price levels.
 However in the wake of the Ukraine invasion, prices have reached as 
high as $130/barrel, i.e. similar price growth to last year’s and 
hitting real incomes again.
 - Energy prices (impact on confidence): Energy prices also 
have a clear — inverse — relationship with consumer confidence. Consider
 that confidence didn’t recover strongly in the last expansion until oil
 prices collapsed throughout 2014. High oil prices flowing through to 
the gas pump are likely to diminish household confidence.
 - Wealth effects: Falling asset prices mean households feel less wealthy and make them pull back from expenditures and save more.
 - Supply-chain disruptions: Russia’s invasion is another 
blow to globally integrated supply chains that have repeatedly gummed up
 economic output over the last two years.
 
 
Despite this litany of headwinds, it’s not clear as of today that 
they outweigh the tailwinds the U.S. economic cycle continues to 
experience:
 
- Growth, though decelerating, has momentum and is running above trend growth in 2022, providing some insulation from shocks.
 - Household sector remains healthy, as balance sheets are still very 
strong across income cohorts, including elevated cash balances.
 - Labor markets are very tight, with record job openings, strong 
hiring, and strong wage gains providing a robust domestic tailwind to 
continued consumption.
 - Firms remain highly profitable and interested in investing, as they look to build resilience and new capacity.
 - Direct U.S. trade linkages to Russia and Ukraine are modest 
overall, and potential disruptions will come as Americans continue to 
reemerge from Covid shutdowns.
 
 
These tailwinds and headwinds are not exhaustive, nor is it possible 
to confidently net them against each other. But the backdrop of the U.S 
cycle remains one that suggests the expansion can continue.
 
A Policy Error Remains the Central Recession Threat
 
This means the most plausible source of risk remains a so-called 
policy error recession. Even before the war, a policy error was the key 
risk to the expansion: Hike interest rates too little or too slowly and 
inflation may spiral out of control; hike rates too high or too fast and
 an unnecessary recession occurs.
 
The war has made the Fed’s high-wire act even more precarious. To get
 the balance of headwinds and tailwinds right, policy makers have to 
interpret all the drivers we discussed so far — energy, labor markets, 
product demand, supply chains, etc. — without having full visibility or 
timely data. The impact of energy prices, for example, was difficult 
enough to gauge before the war. Now it’s gotten a lot harder, and so the
 risk of a policy error is also a lot higher.
 
Before the invasion, markets saw the Fed delivering seven interest 
rate hikes through the beginning of 2023 to bring inflation under 
control. Many observers feared that would be too much for the cycle to 
survive. Today, the market still sees about seven hikes — basically 
unchanged despite the massive increase in uncertainty. The key question 
is not if the war derails the expansion, but if the Fed can negotiate a 
soft landing with that degree of tightening.
 
What Executives Can Do
 
As the shock of the invasion reverberates through the economy and 
cycle risk builds, executives will strive to position their businesses 
to minimize impact. Here are a few do’s and don’ts.
 
- Don’t rely on forecasts as extreme uncertainty prevails; flimsy in the best of times, they remain out of reach.
 - Do build the capabilities to analyze and model the transmission of shocks and stress test using scenario planning.
 - Don’t assume that shocks deliver structural change – they can, but 
in the fog of the moment the bar for inflection often appears 
deceptively low.
 - Don’t assume that pricing power persists. As growth moderates and 
inventories build, firms may well return to defending market share.
 - Do think of productivity growth as a sustainable source of competitive advantage.
 
 
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine occurs just as pressures in the U.S. 
economy peaked, and prospects of a soft landing were good. The days, 
weeks, and months ahead will bring more clarity about how it impacts the
 U.S. economic cycle. A recession is not a foregone conclusion, and 
companies should stay flexible, reassessing their outlooks and tactics 
as events unfold.